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portant factor in the infant's failure to correct the attorney's mistake. 227
The Court felt that wherever the fault might lie, it is the plaintiff who
stands to suffer.2 28
While the Court of Appeals' unanimous affirmance was a refusal
to interfere with the discretion of the lower court, its flexible stand in
permitting this presumption of disability attending infancy increases
the possibility that infants may institute otherwise untimely actions.
In accommodating the plaintiff, the Court also recognized the difference in treatment afforded to similar fact situations. 229 Judge Breitel,
in concurring, stated that the statute should provide greater discretion
in granting relief because it is presently a "mousetrap" to all but the
most sophisticated practitioners. 230
INSuRAN CE LAw

Ins. Law: Insurer not liable in excess judgment suit where refusal to
defend or settle is based on good faith belief that policy had been
cancelled.
In handling a negligence claim against its policyholder which is in
excess of policy limits, a liability insurer is invariably faced with the
choice of either attempting to negotiate a settlement within policy
limits or proceeding to trial in the hope of absolving its insured from
liability. Because of the conflict between the interests of the insurer and
its insured inherent in this situation, the Court of Appeals early
recognized a duty on the part of the insurer to act in good faith in
carrying out its obligations under the insurance contract. In Brassil v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 231 the insurer was held liable for the expenses
incurred by the insured in prosecuting an appeal which the company
had unjustifiably refused to pursue on his behalf.
Even after Brassil, however, courts often afforded the insurer wide
discretion in deciding whether or not to settle.232 Then, in 1928, the
Hosp., 83 App. Div. 2d 779, 307 N.Y.S.2d 880 (2d Dep't 1969) (mem.), aff'd mein., 26
N.Y.2d 997, 259 N.E.2d 499, 311 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1970); Pandoliano v. New York City Transit
Authority, 17 App. Div. 2d 951, 24 N.Y.S.2d 99 (2d Dep't 1962) (mem.).
227 80 N.Y.2d at 120, 282 N.E.2d at 108, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
228 Id., 282 N.E.2d at 107, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
229 Id. at 119, 282 N.E.2d at 107, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
230 Id. at 121, 282 N.E.2d at 108, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
231 210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 602 (1914).
232 See, e.g., Auerbach v. Maryland Cas. Co., 286 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 (1923);
McAleenan v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 173 App. Div. 100, 159 N.YS. 401 (Ist
Dep't), af'd mnem., 219 N.Y. 563, 114 N.E. 114 (1916); Levin v. New England Cas. Co.,
101 Misc. 402, 166 N.Y.S. 1055 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1917), aff'd mem., 187 App. Div. 935,
174 N.Y.S. 910 (1st Dep't 1919), aff'd memn., 233 N.Y. 631, 135 N.E. 948 (1922).
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Court of Appeals made what was until recently 233 its final statement
on the subject, and the rule it prescribed became the controlling
standard in excess judgment suits in New York against insurers who
refused to settle within policy limits. In Best Building Co. v. Employers'
Liability Assurance Corp.,28 4 the Court refused to hold an insurer
liable for an excess judgment which, argued the insured, resulted
from its negligence. The company had received a settlement offer above
the figure it was willing to meet, and did not inform its insured, who
testified that he would have paid the difference. The judgment was
$6,000 over the policy limit. The unanimous Court held that negligence
was too tenuous a concept to be applied in this context, and approved
the Brassil principle of an implied obligation to exercise good faith in
adhering to the terms of the contract. 235 In rejecting the notion that the
insurer has an implied obligation or absolute duty to settle, Best determined that the insurer is vested with discretion in deciding whether to
settle,3 6 qualified by the good faith requirement.
Federal courts sitting in New York have provided some impetus
in the direction of liberalizing, or at least clarifying, the standards which
determine the liability of an insurer charged with bad faith in settlement negotiations. In Brown v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co.,2 37 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged the indefiniteness of New York law on this point, but felt that New York would,
under the Best rule, follow the modem trend and require that the
insured's interests be given at least equal consideration with those of
the insurer.2 81 Thus, in reversing the district court's dismissal of the
complaint, the court held that it stated a prima facie case of bad
faith. 8 9 To the same effect is Harrisv. Standard Accident & Insurance
Co.,240 which applied the Best rule in finding bad faith on the part of
233

See Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 80 N.Y.2d 427, 285 N.E.2d 849, 334
N.Y.S.2d 601 (1972).
234 247 N.Y. 451, 160 N.E. 911 (1928).
235 Id. at 455, 160 N.E. at 912.
236 See Auerbach v. Maryland Cas. Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 252, 140 N.E. 577, 579 (1923),
which held that the contractual provisions must control, and that if the policy imposes
no duty upon the insurer to settle, none can be implied.
237 314 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1963).
238 The court quoted with approval the rule of thumb formulated by Professor
Keeton that the insurer must view the situation as if there were no policy limit applicable
to the claim. Id. at 678. See Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1136, 1148 (1954).
239 314 F.2d at 682.
240191 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 297 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 843 (1962). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the

ground that the plaintiff, a trustee in bankruptcy for the defendants in the personal
injury action, had not shown any damage to have resulted from the excess judgment.
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an insurer who refused to settle. The District Court for New York's
Southern District stated:
Since the company, therefore, has power through the control of
settlement, to adversely affect the insured's interests, it must necessarily bear a legal responsibility for the proper exercise of that
power. Thus, the law imposes on the insurer the obligation of good
faith- basically, the duty to consider, in good faith, the insured's
interests as well as its own when making decisions as to settle24
ment. 1

Subsequent Second Circuit decisions contributed additional and more
242
precise indicia for determining whether the insurer acted in bad faith.

The developments fostered by the federal courts have been fol-

lowed by more frequent activity in this area among the state's appellate
tribunals. In Cappano v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 243 the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, relying on Harris,held that the trial court's
instruction with respect to bad faith was highly prejudicial and constituted reversible error. The charge required a sinister motive and a
wilful refusal to fulfill an obligation with intent to injure. In addition,
the First Department, in Pipoli v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co.,244 while holding that an insurer had not acted in bad faith in refusing to settle, added a qualification to Brown's good faith factors: "An
insured who steadfastly proclaims his own freedom from fault cannot
245
complain if his insurer believes him and acts accordingly.
The most significant development in recent years in this area of
New York law occurred when the Court of Appeals decided Gordon v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 246 The plaintiff, the insured's receiver, 247 based his action on the insurer's alleged bad faith in refusing
at 540.
See Brockstein v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972); Young v. American Cas. Co., 416 Fd 906 (2d Cir. 1969).
The Young court held that bad faith may be found from the insurer's failure to notify
its insured of a settlement offer, or from its failure to attempt to negotiate a reduction
in the offer. Id. at 910. Brockstein imposed the additional burden on the insurer to inform
its insured of any opportunity for the latter to make a relatively small contribution to
avoid an excess judgment. 417 F-2d at 709.
243 28 App. Div. 2d 639, 280 N.Y.S.2d 695 (4th Dep't 1967).
244 38 App. Div. 2d 249, 328 N.Y.S.2d 688 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 31 N.Y.2d 679, 289
N.E.2d 178, 337 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1972).
245 Id. at 250, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
246 30 N.Y.2d 427, 285 N.E2d 849, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1972), rev'g 37 App. Div. 2d
265, 323 N.Y.$.2d 550 (2d Dep't 1971).
247 The receiver, appointed pursuant to CPLR 5228, was the alter ego for the
judgment creditors of the insured. The use of this procedural device in the context of
an excess judgment suit was directly approved in In re Kreloff, 65 Misc. 2d 692, 319
N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1971). See 7B MCKiNNEY'S CPLR 5201, supp. commentary at 15 (1971).
241 Id.
24 2
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to negotiate a settlement of a negligence claim against its insured, Louis
Porter. The refusal of the insurer, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, to settle stemmed directly from its refusal to defend Porter in the
action, based upon its assertion that the policy had been cancelled. 248
The Court, by a 4-3 majority, reversed the appellate division's determination that the insurer's bad faith had been established.
Assuming that Nationwide was wrong as a matter of law on the issue of policy coverage, Judge Bergan, in the plurality opinion, stated
that the insurer had nevertheless acted in good faith as long as there
was an "arguable case" of coverage. 24 9 Another factor which was deemed
relevant to the issue of good faith was that it was the error of Premier
Credit Corporation, the financing agency which handled Porter's policy,
and not its own error, which caused Nationwide to believe that the
policy had been cancelled. But perhaps the most crucial factor was
Porter's "complete indifference" to his contractual obligations or the
claims against him, 250 since any claim of bad faith must be weighed
against the background of the insured's attitude and willingness to
cooperate. Thus the "heavy punitive judgment"251 which had been imposed was considered unjustifiable under the facts. "[B]ad faith," stated
Judge Bergan, "requires an extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or
dishonest failure to carry out a contract."' a2 Damages, therefore, were
awarded only for breach of contract - Nationwide's failure to defend
-and were measured by the policy limits. 253
248 The policy was issued to Porter through the Premier Credit Corporation, a
finance agency with whom he contracted to pay the premiums. When Porter defaulted,
Premier sent notices of cancellation to him and to Nationwide. Although the notice was
defective under Banking Law § 576(l)(a) and (b), Nationwide relied upon it in asserting
non-coverage. Moreover, as Judge Breitel in his dissent (30 N.Y.2d at 442-43, 285 N.E.2d
at 858, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 613) and the majority in the Second Department (37 App. Div. 2d
at 268-69, 323 N.Y.2d at 554) argued, Premier was authorized under its contract only
to "request cancellation," and Nationwide itself had never cancelled the policy. The
Court of Appeals felt, however, that this method of cancellation was sanctioned by the
statute. 30 N.Y.2d at 434, 285 N.E.2d at 852, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 606.
249 30 N.Y.2d at 431, 285 N.E.2d at 850-51, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 603. See Sukup v. State,
19 N.Y.2d 519, 227 N.E.2d 842, 281 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1967), which involved a claim by the
insured for expenses in litigating the issue of coverage in a separate proceeding. It was
held that the imposition of such extra-contractual liability could not be justified on the
basis of a mere difference of opinion over coverage; the facts must show a "gross disregard" of its policy obligation by the insurer. Id. at 552, 227 N.E.2d at 844, 281 N.Y.S.2d at
31.
250 Porter had ignored several notices by Nationwide advising him that he should
retain other counsel, and defaulted both on his own attorney's application to the court
to withdraw from the case and on application by the original plaintiff's attorneys to take
inquests. In sum, "Porter showed no interest whatever in the consequences [of Nationwide's withdrawal from the defense of his case] to him or to anyone else." 30 N.Y.2d at
435, 285 NE.2d at 853, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
251 Id. at 436, 285 N.E.2d at 854, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 608.
252 Id. at 437, 285 N.E.2d at 854, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
253 Judge Bergan stated that an element of damages would also be the cost of defense,

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

In a lengthy dissent, Judge Breitel vociferously disagreed with the
majority's determination as to the insurer's liability, as well as to the
view implicit in the plurality opinion 254 and explicated by Chief Judge
Fuld in his concurrence, 255 that there was no showing that the insured
suffered any damage as a result of the excess judgment. Implying that
the insurer had a duty to obtain a declaratory judgment on the issue
of policy coverage, 256 Judge Breitel stated that the finding of bad faith
was "virtually compelled by the record." 257 Furthermore, he stated that
Porter's insolvency should not relieve Nationwide from liability, since
there are other economic factors which should be weighed to determine
258
the measure of damages.
The ramifications of Gordon on the bad faith standards in excess
judgment suits are not yet clear, but Gordon appears to represent a step
backward from the recent trend to impose a more positive duty on the
insurer to protect its insured's interests 2 59 It must be remembered, however, that several factors were involved in Gordon which may make it
distinguishable from many similar cases, i.e., the issue of cancellation,
the insured's insolvency, and the insured's complete lack of interest in
if any. Id. at 436, 285 N.E.2d at 854, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 608. But here, Porter did not
defend, and the excess judgment was by default.
254 Id. at 435, 285 N.E.2d at 853, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
255 Id. at 439, 285 N.E.2d at 856, 334 N.YS.2d at 611.
256 Id. at 444, 285 N.E.2d at 858, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 615. In Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Herman, 405 F.2d 121 (Sth Cir. 1968), the insurer refused to defend because of the
pendency of a declaratory judgment action on the coverage issue, contending that to do
so would be inconsistent and would create a conflict of interest. The court rejected this

argument, stating that an insurance company is often in an inconsistent position, and
that this is not a sufficient reason for refusing to defend or "at all material on the
crucial issue of whether good faith was exercised in considering the settlement." Id. at 124.
257 30 N.Y.2d at 446, 285 N.E.2d at 860, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 616.
258Id. at 450-51, 285 N.E2d at 862-63, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 620-21. Some factors listed
by Judge Breitel were "age, economic status, economic prospects, skills, health," and
any other existing conditions which might determine his economic future. Id. at 451, 285
N.E.2d at 863, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 620. Cf. Harris v. Standard Acc. & Ins. Co., 297 F.2d 627 (2d
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 843 (1962), wherein it was held that a trustee in bankruptcy cannot recover in an excess judgment suit without a showing of actual loss to the
insured. The court stated that New York's statutory prohibition against the use by the
insurer of the insured's insolvency or bankruptcy as a defense only applies to liability
within policy limits, and not to excess judgments. Id. at 631. See N.Y. INs. LAw § 167(1)
(a) (McKinney 1966). The damages issue posed no problem for the Gordon majority in
the appellate division, which stated that "the insured is damaged upon entry of the
judgment, irrespective of whether he pays it or has the ability to pay it." 37 App. Div. 2d
at 271, 323 N.YS.2d at 556. See also Henegan v. Merchant Mut. Ins. Co., 31 App. Div. 2d
12, 294 N.Y.S.2d 547 (Ist Dep't 1968).
259 The developments in other jurisdictions have been more far-reaching. For
example, California's highest court has suggested by way of dictum the imposition of
strict liability on an insurer for its refusal to accept a compromise offer where an excess
judgment might result. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 435, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1967). See Note, Recent Developments in the Excess Judgment Suit, 36 BRooK
LYN L. R .464, 470 et seq. (1970).
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his own defense. One result is clear: where it is found that the insurer's
withdrawal from the defense of the negligence action was not made in
bad faith, this fact will serve as justification for its refusal to participate
in settlement negotiations, thereby avoiding liability for a resulting
20
judgment in excess of policy limits. 1
Ins. Law § 59-a: Unauthorized act in New York by agent of foreign insurer held sufficient basis for personaljurisdiction.
Many New York residents hold insurance policies issued by insurers not authorized to do business in this state, and Insurance Law
section 59-a allows such residents to acquire personal jurisdiction over
such insurers. The section permits service of process on the superintendent of insurance if an unauthorized foreign insurer has performed any
of the acts enumerated therein, 2 1 including issuance or delivery of
262
insurance contracts to New York residents.
In Ford v. Unity Hospital,263 the Appellate Division, Second Department, decided whether New York could exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign insurance company whose agent had exceeded its
authority in issuing and delivering a cover note for a malpractice policy
to a New York medical partnership. The partnership was sued for malpractice and brought a third-party action against the insurer, which
argued that under the agency agreement the agent was not authorized
to issue medical malpractice insurance or to do business on its behalf in
New York, and thus could not subject it to New York jurisdiction by
the issuance of the cover note.2 64 Nevertheless, the court held that juris26o0 For a contrary view, see Blakely v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 424 F.2d 728,
734 (5th Cir. 1970), which held that an insurer's "breach of its contract to defend should
not release it from its implied duty to consider [its insured's] interest in the settlement"
even though its reasons for denying liability under the policy may not have been entirely
groundless. Professor Keeton indicates that the insurer can manipulate the situation to
its advantage: "[C]omplete denial of policy coverage and refusal to defend has proven to
be one of the more effective ways for a company to prevent excess liability." Keeton,
Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HRv. L. REv. 1186, 1160 (1954).
261 See, e.g., Zacharakis v. Bunker Hill Mut. Ins. Co., 281 App. Div. 487, 120 N.Y.S.2d
418 (Ist Dep't 1953), which held Insurance Law § 59-a applicable to a foreign insurer which
had issued a policy to a New York resident and collected the premiums through the mail.
262 N.Y. INs. LAw § 59-a(2)(a)(1) (McKinney 1966).
26389 App. Div. 2d 569, 831 N.Y.S.2d 865 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.).
264 The agent's dealings with the insurer, a Mexican company, were carried on
through Mid-Continent Underwriters, Inc., a Louisiana corporation which was the
insurer's managing agent in the United States. A third-party complaint against MidContinent was dismissed, for Mid-Continent was not a party to the agency agreement,
the agent did not purport to act for it in New York, and its activity with respect to the
transaction - the issuance of a cancellation notice to the defendants - was not sufficient
under Insurance Law § 59-a or CPLR 302(a)(1) to subject it to jurisdiction. Id. at 571,
381 N.Y.S.2d at 868.

